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Abstract: During the process of European integration, the main institutions created since the 
founding Treaties of the European Communities have played a decisive role in pushing 
the European project forward. Among these institutions, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (EU)1 is said to be the most neglected by the academics, although it 
has extended significantly the EU policy for decades.
 This article reviews the Court’s evolution, function and main decisions and discusses 
its role, not only as an exclusively legal institution but also as a political player capable 
of driving forward European integration.
 This article claims that the Court has pushed forward integration process in some 
important ways, clarifying and extending EU law. However, the Court is primarily a 
legal institution of an intergovernmental organization, the European Union. Thus, its 
political power and role is limited to Treaties’ provisions and the Member States remain 
the key -actors of the EU’s decision making system until today.
 Keywords: European integration, justice, politics, neo -functionalism, liberal 
intergovernmentalism
Resumo: durante o processo de integração europeia, as principais instituições criadas a partir 
dos tratados fundadores das comunidades europeias desempenharam um papel 
decisivo no desenvolvimento do projeto europeu. entre estas instituições, o tribunal de 
Justiça da união europeia (tJue) é referido como sendo o mais negligenciado pelos 
académicos, não obstante a sua ampla contribuição para a consolidação institucional 
da ue. 
 este artigo examina a evolução, função e principais decisões do tJue e discute o seu 
papel, não só como uma instituição exclusivamente judicial, mas também como um 
interveniente na cena política e institucional da ue, capaz de conduzir e promover a 
integração europeia. 
 este artigo argumenta que o tribunal tem potenciado o processo de integração 
em alguns aspetos importantes, esclarecendo e ampliando, por exemplo, o direito 
da união europeia. no entanto, o tribunal é principalmente uma instituição judicial 
de uma organização intergovernamental, a união europeia. assim, o seu poder 
de intervenção política e papel institucional alargado é limitado às disposições dos 
tratados, permanecendo os estados ‑membros os atores ‑chave do sistema de tomada 
de decisão da ue.
 Palavras -chave: integração europeia, justiça, política, neo ‑funcionalismo, 
intergovernamentalismo liberal.
1. Introduction
it is no secret that the case law of the court has been a major driving force towards euro‑
pean integration.2
* PhD in Political Science and International Relations by the Catholic University of Lisbon, M.A. in European Studies by the 
University of Reading, Uk and M.A. in International Politics by the Université Libre de Bruxelles, Assistant Professor in the Law 
Department at the University Portucalense Researcher at the Instítuto Jurídico Portucalense and at Observare (Universiade 
Autónoma de Lisboa)
1 As named under the Lisbon Treaty.
2 Vassilios Skouris quoted in the economist – Charlemagne. Government by judges? The European Court of Justice emerges 
blinking into the limelight, 15th of January, 2004. Available on line: http://www.economist.com/node/2349980?story_id=E1_NPq
JJRD&CFID=168245426&CFTOkEN=56411237 Last access: 1st of September, 2011
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In the first part of the twentieth century, two schools of thought, Federalism3 and 
Functionalism4, dominated the theoretical debate over European integration, contemplating 
mainly the avoidance of future wars in the European continent. 5 yet, later theories about 
European Integration grew out of this intellectual context and sought to explain more issues 
as how the creation of supranational institutions as the Court of Justice could accelerate the 
process of political integration in Europe.
Indeed, neo -functionalist scholars6 have asserted the Court’s legitimacy as the legal 
actor. The Court has power and autonomy to rule against the interests of the Member States.7 
Intergovernmentalists8 though claim that the Court simply applies Treaty provisions and rules 
formulated by the Member States of the EU. According to this school, Court’s interpretation is 
mainly a translation of the rules into operational language.9
Moreover, as Andrew Moravcsik has claimed, the explanation for European integration 
is to be found in the factors that created the Treaties. Supranational institutions, thus, tend to 
make cooperation more likely. This is mainly because once the procedure for negotiations in 
the EU has been decided; all subsequent negotiations become easier and less costly than the 
first negotiation.10
Today, given the current financial crisis, the academic and political discussion over the 
future model of the European Union regains an exceptional interest. The question is: Are we 
going towards a federal union of states or towards the end of European integration and in what 
ways the Court’s powers shall be affected? 
For the purpose of this study, the period examined lays between the creation of the 
Court in the 1950’s till its current formation, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009. This period forms an era rich in political decisions and actions by Europe’s institutional 
structures and particularly by the Court towards a more federal model for Europe. 
Firstly, the present article weights claims and facts, seeking answers to the following 
research questions:
3 For instance, Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi have produced some very influential work which has affected the course of 
modern federalism. See: SPINELLI, Altiero – “The Growth of the European Movement since the Second World War”, in HOD-
GES, Michael (ed.) – european integration: selected readings, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972, p.p. 43 -68. For a thorough 
analysis over European integration theories see also: WIENER, Antje and DIEZ, Thomas – european integration theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004 and ROSAMOND, Ben – theories of european integration. Palgrave: Basingstoke, 
2000
4 MITRANy, David – The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional, in GROOM A. J. R. And TAyLOR Paul (eds.) – func‑
tionalism: theory and practice in international relations. London: University of London Press, 1975, p.p. 53 -66
5 In order to avoid war, Federalism advocates the creation of a European political federation. On the other hand, Functionalism 
focuses on common interests shared by states. It supports the cooperation model among countries through the integration of 
one or more highly important economic function shared by all of them.
6 A key architect of neo -functionalism was Ernst HAAS, whose major work, The Uniting of Europe, published in 1958, is still 
one of the main theoretical texts of European integration theory. See: HAAS, Ernest – “International Integration: The European 
and the Universal Process”, in international organization, Vol. 15, No. 3. Summer, 1961, pp. 366 -392
7 See also: ALTER, karen J. – “Who are the ‘Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice” 
international organization. Vol. 52, Nº 1, 1998, p.p. 121 -147; ALTER, karen J. – Explaining National Court Acceptance of 
European Court Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration in WEILER, J.H.H, SLAUGHTER, Anne-
-Marie, SWEET, Alec Stone – the european court and national courts (Eds). Oxford: Hart Publications, 1998, p.p. 227 -253
8 HOFFMANN, Stanley – “Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation -State and the Case of Western Europe”, dædalus 
95, 1966, p.p. 862 -915
9 BURLEy, Anne -Marie and WALTER Mattli. “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration.” international 
organization, Vol. 47, Nº 1, 1993, p.p. 47 -76
10 For more on liberal intergovernmentalism, see MORAVCSIk, Andrew – “Negotiating the Single European Act: national inte-
rests and conventional statecraft in the European Community”. international organization Vol. 45, Nº 1, 1991 p.p. 19 -56. 
MORAVCSIk, Andrew – the choice for europe: social purpose and state power from messina to maastricht. Ny: Cornell 
University Press, 1998
59
JUSTICE AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE FUTURE 
OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
1.  To what extent the Court can be considered a powerful political institution capable 
of driving forward European integration, with or without nation -states’ will (or is an 
exclusively legal institution with limited powers)?
2.  Is the current economical crisis a reason for extending or diminishing Court’s powers?
Under this prism, the present article firstly introduces this unique legal institution, its 
competencies and evolution. It then moves to an empirical and theoretical analysis of the 
Court’s legal and political achievements until today. 
Last but not least, the present paper frames Court’s political role vis a vis Europe’s current 
political challenges trying to define its strengths and limitations in drawing EU’s future path.
2. The Court of Justice of the European Union – What Mission?
The Court of Justice of the European Union, which has its seat in Luxembourg, consists 
of three Courts: the Court of Justice, the General Court (formerly called the Court of First 
Instance) and specialised Courts.11 The Civil Service Tribunal was created in 2004. 
Since the establishment of the Court of justice of the EU in 1952 utill today, its mission has 
been to guarantee that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties.
the court of Justice of the european union shall, in accordance with the treaties:
(a)  rule on actions brought by a member state, an institution or a natural or legal person;
(b)  give preliminary rulings, at the request of courts or tribunals of the member states, on 
the interpretation of union law or the validity of acts adopted by the institutions;
(c)  rule in other cases provided for in the treaties.12
So, the most common types of cases brought before the Court of Justice of the EU are:
1.  requests for a preliminary ruling – when national courts ask the court of Justice to 
interpret a point of eu law
2.  actions for failure to fulfill an obligation – brought against eu governments for not 
applying eu law
3.  actions for annulment – against eu laws thought to violate the eu treaties or fundamental 
rights
4.  actions for failure to act – against eu institutions for failing to make decisions required of them
5.  direct actions – brought by individuals, companies or organisations against eu decisions 
or actions. 13
The Court’s competences, as defined in the Treaties, demonstrate the importance of 
this body. This legal framework is EU’s unique feature that distinguishes it from the other 
intergovernmental organizations. It is important to mention also that the judges act independently 
from any national order. yet, there are some important points in article 19 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU) that remind and highlight the intergovernmental character of the EU 
and thus the certain limitations of Courts’ decisions. 
it shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the treaties the law is observed.14 
But, Treaties are agreements between states, a conciliation of interests. Hence, the 
European law is the product of the Members States’ will and legislation. Indeed, sensitive policy 
areas as taxation, social security, education, health care, pension systems, foreign policy, common 
11 Article 19, Treaty of the European Union, consolidated versions of the treaty on european union and the treaty on the 
functioning of the european union. Official Journal of the European Union, C 83, Volume 53, 30 of March 2010, p. 27
12 ibid
13 Gateway to the European Union. Official Site available at: http://europa.eu/about -eu/institutions -bodies/court -justice/index_en.htm 
14 Article 19, TEU, paragraph 1, p. 27
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defence even the jurisdiction of the Court in the area of intellectual property are still governed 
by unanimity.15 In other words, the most interesting political items for the public opinion of the 
Member States do not fall under European jurisdiction. This means that the Court defends the 
law that is the result of an intergovernmental accord, at least on issues which are vital to the 
national interest and sovereignty of the 27 Member States. 
The Treaty also provides that the judges shall be elected and then appointed not by a 
supranational European authority but by common accord of the governments of the member 
states for six years.16
3. The evolving Treaty Framework 
The Court of Justice, created as soon as the first European Community, assumed 
responsibility for all three Communities when the European Economic Community (EEC) and 
the Euratom Treaties entered into force in 1958. Since then, the Court of Justice is charged with 
the duty of ensuring that the law is observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties. 
Under the Maastricht Treaty, signed in 1992, the European Union based on a three 
pillars structure was created 17. The influence of the Court resided clearly in the first pillar, the 
Community pillar, having limited power concerning the remaining two: the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), and the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).18. 
Later on, with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the Court extended its powers. 
Indeed, issues from the third pillar19 were transferred to the first pillar like asylum policy, migration 
and judicial co -operation in civil matters. 20 Previously, these issues were settled between the 
Member States, on a clearly intergovernmental basis. 
With the Treaty of Nice signed in 2001 preparing the EU for its future enlargement with 
ten new Member States, the Court gained further competences in a wider range of political 
areas. It is granted jurisdiction in disputes relating to EU industrial property rights.21 The Treaty 
envisaged the creation of specialised judicial panels to hear cases in specific areas. Accordingly, 
following a practice in the Member States, a specialised EU tribunal could be created to deal 
with disputes in the field of employment and industrial relations.22 Indeed, one such specialised 
tribunal has been created to deal with cases involving staff employed by the EU institutions: 
the Civil Service Tribunal.
With the Lisbon Treaty the three pillars’ structure of the Maastricht Treaty disappeared. 
23 Since 2009, the field of police and criminal justice became part of the general law. So, any 
national court or tribunal has now the ability to request a preliminary ruling from the Court. yet, 
transitional provisions provide that full jurisdiction cannot apply until 2014. 24
15 BLANkE, Hermann -Josef and MANGIAMELI Stelio (Eds) – the european union after lisbon: constitutional Basis, economic 
order and external action. New york: Springer. 2011
16 ibid, paragraph 3, p. 27
17 Three pillars: the European Communities, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters (JHA)
18 GRIEGO, Joseph M. – The Maastrich Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the Neo -Realist Research Programme. 
review of international studies, Vol. 2 , 1995, p.p. 21 -40
19 Pillar named under the Amsterdam Treaty: Police and Judicial Co -operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC)
20 MONAR, Jörg and WESSELS, Wolfgang – the european union after the amsterdam treaty. London: Continuum. 2001
21 Article 262, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)
22 LAURSEN, Finn – the treaty of nice: actor preferences, Bargaining and institutional choices. Leiden: Martinus Niijhoff. 2006
23 DUFF, Andrew – saving the european union: the logic of the lisbon treaty. London: Shoehorn. 2009
24 In Article 10 of Protocol No 36 on transitional provisions (Official Journal 115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0322 – 0326, also available on 
line at: 
http://eur -lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEx:12008M/PRO/36:EN:HTML Last access: 1st of September, 2011), 
it is provided that, as a transitional measure, the powers of the Court of Justice are to remain the same with respect to acts 
in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters which have been adopted before the entry into 
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In addition, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on measures taken on grounds of public 
policy in connection with cross -border controls. Likewise, under the Lisbon Treaty, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union gained the same legal value as the Treaties.25 
yet, the Member States’ preferences still define national participation. The EU remains 
a mainly intergovernmental organization although the European project has been developing 
and growing further over the years. For instance, the Charter of Fundamental Rights cannot be 
invoked against two Member States with significant population, United kingdom and Poland. As 
Article 1 of the Protocol on the Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union to Poland and to the United kingdom states the Charter does not extend the ability of the 
Court of Justice or of any Court or tribunal of those two Member States to find that any decision 
or action is inconsistent with the fundamental rights, freedoms or principles that it reaffirms.26
In addition, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) still remain subject to special rules and specific procedures. Political 
decisions concerning Security and Defence remain highly intergovernmental, as national 
sovereignty and interests are the key determinants of these decisions. Therefore, the Court 
of Justice does not have jurisdiction to monitor provisions relating to those policies. The Court 
does only have jurisdiction to monitor the delimitation of the EU’s competences and the CFSP, 
CSDP. For instance, it has jurisdiction over actions for annulment brought against decisions 
providing for restrictive measures adopted by the Council against natural or legal persons. The 
Court has jurisdiction in connection, for example, with measures combating terrorism.27
So, it is clear that, a number of important changes were made to the Treaties covering 
the EU’s legal institution in order to prepare for enlargement, improving their function and 
amending their responsibilities. Indeed, all Treaties have strengthened the role of the Court 
and have advanced the integrationist process even in a minor way. And the Lisbon Treaty is 
the latest in a line of Treaties amending and extending Court’s competencies. But, there is, 
for example, no fundamental upheaval in the EU’s institutional structure nor a great extension 
to the institutional competencies, neither of the Court nor of any other institution. There is no 
attempt to transform the intergovernmental nature of the EU. 
However, the current financial crisis seems to make this transformation more urgent 
than ever before. On 2 March 2012, the EU leaders with the exception of the United kingdom 
and the Czech Republic signed a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) 
in the Economic and Monetary Union. The main aim of the Treaty is to safeguard the stability 
of the euro area as a whole.28 
the eu court of Justice will be able to verify national transposition of the balanced budget 
rule. its decision is binding, and can be followed up with a penalty of up to 0.1% of gdp, payable 
to the european stability mechanism in the case of euro area member states.29
force of the Treaty of Lisbon. This transitional measure is to cease to have effect five years after the date of entry into force 
of the Treaty of Lisbon.
25 See Art. 6, paragraph 2, TEU that provides that the Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties. See, 
also, Protocol No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty that requires a certain number of substantive guarantees necessary in an agreement 
relating to the accession so that the specific characteristics of EU law will be preserved.
26 See Protocol No 30 annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) on the application of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to Poland and to the United kingdom (the Charter creates justiciable rights 
applicable to Poland or the United kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United kingdom has provided for such rights 
in its national law).
27 CROWTHER Simon – “EU court to rule on fairness of keeping evidence secret from terrorist suspects”. the guardian. 16th 
of June, 2011 Available on line: http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/jun/16/eu -court -evidence -terrorist -suspects Last access: 
12th of September, 2011
28 Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the Economic and Monetary Union http://european -council.europa.
eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf 
29 Press Release, Consilium Europa 2nd of March 2012: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/
ec/128454.pdf last access: 10th of July, 2012
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Under this Treaty, the Court is gaining a central role in fiscal and welfare policy -making. 
The new law is to be introduced into the national law of each of the signatory states within one 
year of the Treaty coming into force and this introduction should be permanent and if possible 
constitutional. A constitutional alteration towards this direction would mean certainly a significant 
step towards further European integration.
4. Case law and European principles
During the years, the Court itself, not only has interpreted law but has also helped 
Member States “to clarify and extend eu policy and develop and foster the eu’s spirit”.30 The 
Court of Justice goes beyond merely giving an interpretation of the written rules, it clarifies 
and extends them.
The Court has exercised the greatest influence in strengthening and extending EU policy 
competences in regard to the internal market. 31 Furthermore, the powers and functions of the 
European institutions have been affected considerably by the Court’s jurisdiction. 
The Court has set important principles that were never mentioned in the Treaties. These 
principles, which were created by Court’s case -law, were innovative and revolutionary.32 But, 
what were these original principles which were so important for the European integration?
For the purpose of this study, particular attention is given to the three principles that 
largely define the relation between the EU and national law, the principles responsible for 
offering what makes EU today a unique phenomenon in the international organizations’ history: 
direct effect, primacy and state liability. In fact, ordinary international Treaties can only have 
an effect in the domestic legal order of a state if that state performs some act to introduce the 
Treaty contents into its legal order.33
In 1962, a Dutch national court referred a case between a Netherlands customs agency 
and a Dutch import firm, Van Gend en Loos, to the Court.34 The firm claimed that the Dutch 
government had violated a Treaty provision prohibiting Member States from enacting new import 
taxes on goods once the state had entered the European Community (EC). In particular, it had 
violated Article 12 of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty which provided as follows:
member states shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new customs duties 
on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect, and from increasing those which 
they already apply in their trade with each other.35
the result is first that the effect of community law on the internal law of member states 
cannot be determined by this internal law but only by community law, further that the national 
courts are bound to apply directly the rules of community law and finally that the national court 
is bound to ensure that the rules of community law prevail over conflicting national laws even if 
they are passed later.36
30 NUGENT, Neill – the government and politics of the european union. 7th Edition. European Union Series: Palgrave Mac-
millan. 2010, p.225
31 NUGENT, Neill – the government and politics of the european union. 7th Edition. European Union Series: Palgrave Mac-
millan. 2010; POLLACk, Mark – the engines of integration: delegation, agency, and agency setting in the european union. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003; TALLBERG, Jonas – European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making 
States Comply. London: Routledge. 2003
32 WEILER, Joseph – the constitution of europe: “do the new clothes have an emperor?”. Cambridge University Press, 1999
33 The domestic law of every country contains constitutional rules which deal with the status of international law in their domestic 
legal system. It is these rules which determine how international law can take effect in national law.
34 Judgment of the Court of the 5th of February 1963. NV Algemene Transport - en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & 
Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tariefcommissie – Pays -Bas. Case 
26 -62. 1963. Available on line in Eur - Lex. Access to European Union Law: http://eur -lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CELEx:61962J0026:EN:NOT Last Access: 1st of September 2011
35 Article 12 of the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty
36 ibid, Case 26/61, p. 7
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The principle of direct effect was, thus, established by the European Court of Justice.
However, even after the doctrine of direct effect was created, the question of which 
law – national or European – was supreme if both coexisted, still remained. In 1964, the Court 
was able to resolve this conflict with the Costa v. Enel case. In this case, there was a conflict 
between Italian laws on the national electricity monopoly and EC provisions allowing for the 
free movement of goods. The Court of Justice established a clear hierarchy between European 
and national law, stating that: 
By creating a community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own perso‑
nality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more 
particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the 
states to the community, the member states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited 
fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and themselves.37
Consequently, EU law constitutes an autonomous legal system, imposing obligations 
and rights on individuals and states, limiting their sovereignty. The unprecedented fact about 
this particular case was that it marked the first time a private actor claimed a European law in 
its own defense.
Member States initially gave the Court’s powers to hear disputes between states and 
the EU’s governing institutions in an effort to keep EU’s institutions checked. With both the Van 
Gend en Loos and Costa v. Enel decisions, the Court established the core foundational principles 
of EU law, direct effect and primacy, constructing a decentralized enforcement mechanism for 
EU law. These decisions reinforced the role of the Court of Justice by allowing individuals to 
invoke European law in national courts.38
Over the decades, the Court of Justice has elaborated on this principle in a series 
of judgments, gradually expanding the scope of direct effect so that it now applies to most 
secondary legislation, namely directives. A situation that has provoked much criticism on the 
part of Member States, who argued that EU directives only acquire legal force once they have 
been adopted within national law.39 
The Court of Justice continued to refine its legal doctrine throughout the 1980s and 1990s, 
and a good example is the 1991 landmark decision of Francovich and Others v. Italy.40 In this 
particular case, Francovich et al. sued the Italian government for failing to provide them with 
their salaries even after their employer had become insolvent. In the Francovich decision, the 
Court ruled that individuals are entitled to financial compensation if they are “adversely affected” 
by the failure of a Member State to carry out an EU directive within the prescribed timeframe. 41
In this manner, the Court announced the doctrine of state liability, which claimed that a 
national court can hold a state financially accountable for damages provoked by individuals due 
to the failure to implement correctly EU legislation. In other words, the Francovich ruling extended 
the Court’s jurisdiction on matters relating to secondary legislation, or any regulations, directives 
or decisions made by the European Commission, Parliament, or Council. Consequentially, the 
37 Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Giudice conciliatore di Milano 
– Italy. Case 6 -64. Available at Eur Lex: http://eur -lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEx:61964CJ0006:EN:PDF 
p. 593 Last Access: 1st of September, 2011 
38 ALTER, karen J. – “Who are the ‘Masters of the Treaty? European Governments and the European Court of Justice” inter‑
national organization. Vol. 52, Nº 1, 1998, p.p. 121 -147
39 NUGENT 2010, p. 292; Stone Sweet 2004, p. 68
40 Judgment of the Court of 9 November 1995. – Andrea Francovich v Italian Republic. – Reference for a preliminary ruling: 
Pretura circondariale di Vicenza – Italy. – Social policy – Protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their 
employer – Directive 80/987/EEC – Scope – Employees whose employer is not subject to procedures to satisfy collectively 
the claims of creditors. – Case C -479/93 http://eur -lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEx:61993J0479:EN:HTML 
Last Access: 1st of September, 2011
41 Gateway of the European Union: http://eur -lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEx:61990J0006:EN:NOT 
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potential range of claimants bringing a case against a Member State to the Court became 
almost unlimited. 
Certainly, the above mentioned cases have fundamentally transformed the role of the Court 
to a monitor of compliance by EU Member States. But what evidence is there demonstrating that 
Member States have accepted entirely the authority of the Court as supreme to national law? 
Member States do respect and tend to comply with EU law. Without that compliance 
the EU could not continue to develop and advance. However, occasionally Member States do 
negotiate certain opt -outs from legislation or Treaties of the European Union. This means that 
certain members do not have to participate in certain policy areas. At present, five countries 
have such opt -outs: Denmark, Ireland, Poland, Sweden and the United kingdom.42 
For instance, the Uk, as mentioned above, does not participle in the Chapter of Fundamental 
Rights of the EU. The related Protocol states that the Charter does not extend the ability of the 
Court to find that Uk law is inconsistent with the rights and principles exposed in the Charter. 
Similarly, national courts can and have shown disapproval of Court activism sometimes 
even threatening to disobey. The German constitutional Court in its recent judgment on the 
Lisbon treaty signaled that should european law continue to threaten the core of the german 
constitutional settlement – the german “social state” – that court would be obliged to disapply 
european law. 43 
Member states have also taken to writing clauses into EU Treaties and legislation 
protecting national policies. For instance, the Danish government insisted on a provision in 
the Maastricht Treaty that allows it to ban Germans from buying vacation homes, and the Irish 
government demanded a protocol making it clear that nothing in EU law will interfere with 
Ireland’s constitutional ban on abortion. 44
yet in many case, Member States had to accept legal decisions that really challenged the 
principle of national sovereignty. In the Cassis de Dijon case45 the Court, in its preliminary ruling 
on a German regulation blocking the sale of a French liqueur because it did not meet particular 
German criteria on alcoholic beverages, declared that the German government’s quantitative 
restrictions constituted an illegal barrier to trade. Similarly, the kramer Case46 concerning the 
establishment of a common structural policy for the fishing industry in the Netherlands, the Court 
stated that action by the EC in a particular area of competence deprives national authorities 
of their powers to act independently.
yet, Member States continue to invest their trust in the Court’s decisions in the long 
run, even though they may appear to be at odds with domestic interests in the short term.47 
42 TSEBELIS, George and GARRETT, Geoffrey. “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism 
in the European Union.” international organization. vol. 55, Nº 2, 2001, p.p. 357 -390; NUGENT, Neill – the government and 
politics of the european union. 7th Edition. European Union Series: Palgrave Macmillan. 2010, p. 225; POLLACk, Mark – the 
engines of integration: delegation, agency, and agency setting in the european union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2003; 
TALLBERG, Jonas – European Governance and Supranational Institutions: Making States Comply. London: Routledge. 2003
43 Federal Constitutional Court – Press office – Press release no. 72/2009 of 30 June 2009 Judgment of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 
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The European Union has established a strong legal order over the years. The Court of 
Justice has been successfully pursuing its political programme of European integration, with 
important accomplishments taking place over the years. It must be noted, in this respect, that 
a total of 1.406 cases were brought before the three Courts comprising the Court of Justice in 
2010. According to the 2010 Annual Review, this figure is the highest in the institution’s history 
and reflects the constant increase in the volume of European Union litigation. However, the 
year 2011, with 1.569 new cases and 1.518 cases completed, was a year marked by an even 
more intense judicial activity. 48
Certainly, the Court is neither a “master” nor a “servant” of the Member States. The 
institutions can determine the sequence of moves, the choices of actors and the information 
they control. 49 But, at the same time, states hold the power of policy decision and action. 
These empirical conclusions have been put into perspective by some significant theoretical 
work too. 
Neofunctionalism predicts that the drivers of EU legal integration are the supra -national 
and sub -state actors pursuing their own self -interest. So, the Court and the lower national 
courts of Member States are the key players involved in the development of a supra -national 
legal order in the EU.50 Furthermore, as Sweet claims “principals are not unified entity; rather 
they are represented by a multiple of governments who will typically exhibit divergent interests 
on any important policy issue on which the court takes a position”.51
yet, according to liberal intergovernmentalism, Court´s policies make Europe quiet 
powerful and unique as an international actor.52 The Court is itself limited by political and legal 
constraints imposed by Member States. Indeed, states remain important as the main political 
actors of the EU’s decision making system and as the main agents that implement EU law. 
5. Some Conclusions and Future Perspectives for the Court
The Court is a key institution of the European Union. The Court, indeed, has pushed 
forward integration process, during its existence, in important ways, clarifying and extending 
EU law. 
Under the current financial crisis, many scholars as well as politicians urge for deeper 
integration. 
EU president Barroso claimed recently that “if we do not move forward with more 
unification, we will suffer more fragmentation”.53 Many scholars have claimed also that in a 
rather counterintuitive manner, crises tend to push integration forward.54 The current crisis has, 
however, posed serious challenges regarding the future integration of the EU. Some significant 
48 In 2010, the Court had 631 new cases brought before it (without account being taken of the joinder of cases on the ground 
of similarity), which amounts to a very significant increase compared with 2009 (562 new cases). See: President Skouris and 
Annual Report 2011 http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7000/ Annual Report 2010: Available on Line: http://curia. europa.
eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2011 -05/ra2010_version_integrale_en.pdf Last access: 12th of September 2011
49 TSEBELIS, George and GARRETT, Geoffrey. “The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism 
in the European Union.” international organization, vol. 55, Nº 2, 2001, p.p. 357 -390
50 BURLEy, Anne -Marie and WALTER Mattli. “Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal Integration.” international 
organization. Vol. 47, Nº 1, 1993, p.p. 47 -76
51 SWEET, Alec Stone, “The European Court of Justice and the Judicialization of EU Governance”. faculty scholarship series. 
Paper 70, 2010
52 MORAVCSIk, Andrew – the choice for europe: social purpose and state power from messina to maastricht. Ny: Cornell 
University Press, 1998
53 WATERFIELD, Bruno – EC president Barroso urges deeper economic integration. The Telegraph. 28th of September, 2011. 
Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/8793520/EC -president -Barroso -urges -deeper -economic -integration.
html Last access: 29th of September, 2011
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divisions have urged debates not only on the possibility of further integration, but also on the 
form that this integration will be achieved. 
yet either outcome, more or less Europe, shall have an important impact on the future 
role of the Court both related to its power as the main legal institution of the EU and to its 
power as a political actor shaping the path for further integration.
Member States have already provided a lot of both political and financial capital. The 
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) is backed for a total of €780 billion by guarantee 
commitments from the euro zone Member States. It also has a lending capacity of €440 billion. 
Still, a European fiscal union remains a really ambitious project. 
A fiscal union requires fiscal solidarity among taxpayers and a larger than the current 
EU budget. A fiscal union also requires the creation of a federal economic government. This 
means that the Commission must be made capable of running a common economic policy, with 
the power to coerce governments that disobey financial order, held to account by the European 
Parliament and fiscalised by the Court of Justice. 55 An important step towards this direction 
was made with the signing of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance on March 
2012, as the Court gained a fundamental role in fiscal and welfare policy -making.
for the euro area to be credible – and this is not only the message of the federalists, this 
is the message of the markets – we need a truly community approach. 56
yet, EU leaders should follow the message of the markets and prove their commitment 
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